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ABSTRACT
In this paper we develop a framework for determining optimal profit taxa-
tion for a welfare-maximising government. We show that there is a dynamic
trade-off between public consumption now and in the future. Two possible
solutions are derived. The first solution, which is the formal outcome of
an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium of a game between government and
firms, is time-inconsistent. The second solution, which corresponds to a
feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, is time-consistent, but yields a lower
value of steady-state utility. The outcome of the feedback Stackelberg
equilibrium depends on the number of firms in this economy. If the numberof firms is large this equilibrium coincides with the open-loop Nash
solution. Furthermore, we show the dynamic paths if the economy goes from
its feedback to its open-loop steady state.
1. ZNTRODUCTION
In this paper we focus on the problem of the trade-off between investment
behaviour of the firm and the tax policy of a'rational' government. The
government may announce a relatively low corporate tax rate, resulting in
a lower level of public consumption than preferred by consumers. But this
relatively low tax rate also implies a higher level of investment, which
generates a higher level of total consumption in the future. In this
paper we model this dynamic trade-off between corporation taxation now and
in the future within a macro-economic framework.
The question of optimal taxation is a very broad one and many strands
of literature can be identified, see for example Ramsey (192~), Sandmo
(19~6), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Laffer (1981). The first distinction
can be made between papers, which deal with this problem in a static
framework (e.g. Ramsey (192~) and Laffer (1981)) or in a dynamic way (e.g.
Kydland and Prescott (1980), Turnovsky and Brock (1980)). In this paper we
deal with the problem of optimal dynamic taxation. We can also distinguish
between different kinds of tax rates, e.g. sales tax, wage or income tax
and profit tax. In the literature most interest has been paid to the
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problem of optimal static income tax, because of its impact on the supply
and demand for labour (e.g. Laffer (1981)). Relatively little interest has
been paid to the optimal corporate taxation. An example can be found in
Fischer (1980), in which a two period problem is treated. However, this
paper disregards some important issues because there is no separation
between the decision of the firm and the consumer and no taxation in the
first period. We believe that profit taxation has a greater impact on the
outcome of the economic process than the attention in the literature
suggests, because of its impact on the capital accumulation and the in-
vestment decision. In this paper we therefore treat the problem of optimal
profit taxation.
With respect to the behavioural assumptions we develop a game-theore-
tic framework. Firms and consumers take the decisions of the others as
given, but the government takes into account the way in which the other
agents will take their decisions. So, the solution corresponds to a
Stackelberg game with the government as leader and the firms and the con-
sumers playing Nash against each other (cf. BaSar and Olsder (1982, chap-
ter ~)). In this paper different solution concepts are analysed. The first
solution concept is the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. In this case
all players commit themselves to their announced strategies at the begin-
ning of the planning period. However, this solution is time-inconsistent,
i.e. becomes suboptimal over time and is only credible, if the firm has
reasons to believe that the government will not deviate from its announced
plan (e.g. Kydland and Prescott (19~~), Calvo (19~8)). So, even for an
economy in which capital tax is the only tax, there can be time-inconsis-
tency. Therefore, in this paper we want to treat the problem of dynamic
inconsistency in case of only capital taxation more carefully.
If there is no commitment or reputational forces, this solution con-
cept is no longer useful. In that case the feedback Stackelberg equili-
brium can be used. However, in general such a feedback Stackelberg equili-
brium is not easy to calculate. Until now only for a linear-quadratic game
a general solution has been be given. This is the reason why most economic
applications in the literature are of this type, see for example Miller
and Salmon (1985), BaSar, Turnovsky and d'Orey (1988). The aim of this
paper is to give a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium for a game, which is
not linear-quadratic. Furthermore, it will turn out that the outcome of
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this feedback Stackelberg equilibrium depends on the number of firms in
the economy.
In the next section we describe the model for the firms, which is
based on neo-classical theory (e.g. Lucas (196~)), while in the third
section the model for the consumers is given. For reasons of analytical
tractability we assume that there is only one type of consumer and one
type of firm. In the fourth section the behaviour of the government is
described for the case that the government commits itself to its announced
strategy. In the fifth section the implications of the problem of time-
inconsistency are given, while in the sixth section the feedback Stackel-
berg equilibria are calculated. Furthermore, we compare the open-loop and
feedback solutions by applying a numerical example. In section ~ the evo-
lution of the economy is given, if it moves from the time-consistent to
the time-inconsistent steady-state. The last section concludes and gives
some suggestions for future research.
2. THE FIRM'S DECISION PROBLEM
Consider a firm operating in an environment without exogenous uncer-
tainty. The firm decides on its demand for labour and investment, which
are conditional on its expectations, present and future profit tax rates,
present and future interest rates. The firm maximises its discounted
stream of net cash flows (cf. Van der Ploeg (198~))
t
-fr(v)dv
max f [{f(k(t),1(t))-wl(t)}(1-T(t))-i(t)-~o(i(t))]e C dt, (1)i,l 0
where: k: the level of the capital stock,
1: the number of employed workers,
i: the rate of investment,
w: the real wage rate (-constant),
T: the level of corporate tax rate,
r: the rate of interest,
f(k,l): production function,
p(i): internal adjustment costs,
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,~
p(0)-0, sign(~p )-sign(i), p )0.
With respect to the production function we assume that capital and labour
are substitutes and production is characterised by constant returns to
scale (so that fllfkk - fkl - 0). The pla~ing horizon is infinite. The
strictly convex function ~p(.) captures that internal adjustment costs
increase and are zero only if gross investment is zero. It ensures that
capital adjusts in a sluggish manner to changes in interest rate and cor-
porate tax rate. The firm will maximise (1) subject to the capital ac-
cumulation equation
k(t) - i(t) - bk(t),
where: b: rate of depreciation.




q(t)- (r(t)tá)q(t)- fk(1-2(t)), lim e t q(s)k(s) - 0, (3)
s-~
`P (i(t)) - q(t)- 1, (4)
fl - w~ (5)
k(t) - i(t) - ák(t), (6)
in which: q: the (undiscounted) shadow price of capital.
If we assume that f(k,l) is a Cobb-Douglas production function2 and that
wages are constant, then labour is a linear function of capital and the
1) To be precise, we have to distinguish between open-loop and feedback
information structure for the firm. However, if we will see in appendix 2
and 3 for an economy with many firms this makes no difference.
2) To obtain analytical results we specify the production function as a
Cobb-Douglas function. However, we think the whole derivation also holds
for other production functions.
5
partial derivative with respect to capital is a constant. So (3)-(6) can
be rewritten as follows (dropping time-arguments):
9 - (r'ó)q - a(1-T).
i - ~(q). ~r~o, ~(1)-0.
1 - hk,





where a and h are positive constants.
With respect to fixed wages we can assume that there is some union
power, that ensures wages to be equal to some fixed level w(e.g. Oswald
(1985)). It is also possible to model a labour market, where w is deter-
míned by supply and demand for labour (e.g. Abel and Blanchard (1983)). In
that case there may be full employment.
The steady-state investment level is just sufficient to provide forw r
replacement investment, i-bk , so that the shadow price of capital ex-~r ~ w
ceeds one, q-1tp (ók ). This means, that the shadow price of a unit of
capital equals the costs of purchasing investment goods plus the marginal
costs of adjusting the capital stock. The steady-state capital follows
from (~)-(10) and can be expressed as
r
k~- b.~(ar}S~ ), kTCO, krCO.
So if the corporate tax rate raises, capital formation decreases and there
will be less employment.
3. THE CONSUMER'S DECISION PROBLEM
In this section we model the saving-investment decision, similar to Abel
and Blanchard (1983) or Van de Klundert and Peters (1986) for example. The
consumer can choose between consumption now or in the future given his
income from labour, dividend and interest. In this way consumption is an
increasing function of total wealth in the spirit of Metzler (1951) and an
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equilibrium between aggregate demand and supply is achieved by the endoge-
nous adjustment of the sequence of current and future interest rates. We
assume that the consumer takes the decision of the firm and the government
as given. Furthermore, the consumer maximises a concave uLility function,
which depends on private and public consumption.
The consumer chooses a path of consumption, which maximises the pre-
sent value of utilíty over time
-~t
max f u(c,g)e dt.
c 0
where: p: social discount rate (-constant),
c: private consumption,
g: public consumption.
The wealth constraint can be expressed as
b- rb t n t wl - c,




So income is the sum of wages, interest on savings and dividends. The
current-value Hamiltonian for this problem is
H- u(c,g) t x(rb t wl t n- c).
The optimality conditions are:
uc - x.
x - (g-r)x, lim e-~tb(t) - 0,
t-~
(14)
in which: x: the costate variable associated with the dynamic budget
constraint.




lim e 0 b(t) - 0.
t~
In section 2 we did not say anything about the way the firms finance their
investment. After paying wages to the worker, the firm has to decide how
to distribute profit and finance investment. It may finance investment by
retained earnings or issuing new shares or bonds. For example, we can
assume that replacement investment is financed out of retained earnings
and that net investment is financed by bonds. However, because of the fact
that the interest rate on bonds is also r and the Modigliani-Miller theo-
rem holds, all financing schemes are equivalent in the sense that they
lead to the same path of total consumption and investment; they differ,
however, in terms of institutional arrangements (for a proof of this see
Abel and Blanchard (1983, pp. 680-681)).
4. OPEN-LOOP STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIA
We assume that the government has the same utility function as the con-
sumer (cf. Turnovsky and Brock (1980)), that public consumption will be
financed from profit taxation and that there ís no debt. As already noted
in section 1, an important difference between government and firm or
consumer is that the government takes account of the manner in which the
firm and consumer react on its taxation decisions, while the firm and the
consumer take the taxation decision as given. So the formal outcome of the
game corresponds to a three person Stackelberg game with the government as
leader and firm and consumer playing Nash against each other.
The government's problem for the case of open-loop information struc-
tures can be formulated as the following control problem:
-pt
max J u(c,g)e dt ,
i o
s.t.: q - (rtb)q - a{1-T}
(18)
(19)
k - ~(q) - bk, (ZO)
c - {1-T}[f(k,l)-wl]-i-~(i)4w1, (21)
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g - T[f(k,l)-wl], (22)
uc - x' (23)
x - (H-r)x. (24)
b- rb t rr t wl - c. (~5)
Note that equation (21) represents the equilibrium on the goods market and
that equation (22) represents the fact, that there is no debt, because at
every time-point government's spendings, i.e, g, are equal to the revenues
from taxation. Furthermore, we assume that there are Cobb-Douglas prefe-
rences and we have to remember that labour is a linear function of capi-
tal:
u(c,g) - alnc t (1-a)ing, OCaCl, (26)
c - {1-T}ak t whk - ~(q)- p(~(q)), (27)
g - Tak. (28)
It should be noted that we can eliminate b and x. Substituting from (21)
into (23) gives us a value for x. As already stated the stream of con-
sumption will not be influenced by financial streams.
The maximisation of (18) with respect to (19)-(25) yields, by assuming
an interior solution, the followíng necessary conditions:
a~c} 1-a~t
va-0,
C~c7T g ~dT ~
v - Av - (rtó)v - a~~(q) . a ~ . v(0)-0,





where: a: the government's undiscounted marginal value of capital stock,
v: the government's undiscounted marginal value of the shadow price
of the capital stock to the firm (-q).
The Hamiltonian is defined by
H- aln[{1-T}aktwhk-~(q)-p(~(q))] t(1-a)ln(Tak) t~(~(q)-bk) t
v((rtb)q-a(1-T)). (32)
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Together with the condition for the equilibrium in the goods market
f(k,l) - c f g t i f~(i) (33)
we have a complete macro-economic model, which is repeated in appendix 1.
The model has 13 equations and 13 unknown variables and can be solved by
the method of multiple shooting as explained in Lipton et al. (1982). Note
that the condition for the equilibrium in the goods market, together with
tlie anticipation that this condition will hold at future times, determines
at any instant the complete term structure of interest rates. In the
steady-state the rate of interest equals the social discount rate and
personal savings are zero.
From equations (27), (28) and (29) we can derive:
T- T(k,v,q), Tk)0, Tq(0, Tv)0. (34)
It should be noted, that the optimal tax rate will be chosen in such a
way, that the following equation holds, along the equilibrium path (cf.
(29)):
~ - l~a(1 t -~-)
(1-a)k ' (35)
The steady-state follows from eqs. (30) and (31) and can be expressed as:
w ~r w w . .
v"- - a ~~(q )-(a~c ){q ~ (q )} ( 03,
~ b . ,~ ,~a - {a[(1-2 )atwh]~c t (1-a)~k }~(ptb) ) 0.
(36)
(37)
So in the steady-state the amount of public consumption in total con-
sumption is less than 1-a (cf. (35). (36)). Due to equations (12), (27),
(36) and (37), the optimal tax rate in the steady-state can be derived:
. . .
T - T(k ,v ,q ). (3~)
3) assuming that ~~'-(a~c){q~'})0, which is quite reasonable.
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Equation (29) or (35) effectively says that the marginal utility from
public consumption is less than the marginal utility from private consump-
tion. This is contrary to the Fischer paper (1980) where marginal utility
from private consumption equals marginal utility from public consumption.
5. ON TIME-INCONSISTENCY
In the previous section we have described an optimal profit taxation plan
for the government. However, this optimal plan is time-inconsistent,
because there is an incentive for the government to reoptimise and recon-
sider its tax strategy at some later date. Once the capital is installed,
the government has an incentive to renege on its announcement and ask a
higher tax rate. So, contrary to Fischer (1980) also in an economy with
only one tax instrument there can be time-inconsistency. Note, that the
marginal value to the government of the firm's shadow price must equal
zero at the start of the planning period, because the firm's shadow price
is free to jump at that point of time and therefore becomes effectively an
additional policy instrument for the government. So, if the government has
the possibility at some later point of time to make a new initial plan,
this shadow price becomes zero again. The shadow price v can be inter-
preted as a price of time-inconsistency. At a moment that almost all
capital is installed, there is an incentive for the government to ask a
higher tax rate, such that marginal utility from private consumption
equals marginal utility from public consumption, i.e. ~- láa. The extra
gain of increasing the tax rate, such that q decreases by 1, is equal to -
v. Hence, -v equals the marginal value of cheating the firm by suddingly
raising the tax rate. In this way -v can be interpreted as the govern-
ment's cost for sticking to its announced plan.
So if the firm has no reason to believe that the government will stick
to its initial plan, the concept used in the previous section, which
corresponds to an open-loop equilibrium of a Stackelberg game, is no
longer a useful concept.
In the literature three main streams can be qualified for solving the
problem of time-inconsistency. The first attempt is what is called the
loss of leadership (cf. Buiter (1983)). In this view the government gives
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up its role as leader and the interactions between private sector and
government is viewed as a Nash rather than a Stackelberg dynamic game. The
acceptance of this view would, however, mean the denial of existence of
policies which have announcement effects. Secondly, memory strategies,
threats and incentives can be used to substain the time-inconsistent
solution (cf. Backus and Driffill (1985), Barro and Gordon (1983)). Third-
ly, we can use recursive or so-called feedback methods. The present
government's leadership is preserved with respect to the private sector,
but it is lost with respect to future governments, which are free to
optimise.
The aim of this paper is to use the third approach to solve the time-
inconsistency problem. For the model given in the previous sections we
derive the feedback Stackelberg solution in the next section.
6. FEEDBACK STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIA
In general it is not easy to derive the feedback Stackelberg equilibria
for a non-linear quadratic continuous time game. Some examples can be
found in the literature (e.g., BaSar, Haurie, Ricci (1985), Van der Ploeg
and De Zeeuw (1989)). In the appendices 2 and 3 the derivation is given
for the model presented in section 2, 3 and 4. It is shown that the out-
come depends on the number of firms in the economy. Therefore, we distin-
guish between two cases. In the first case there are many identical firms
and all firms are very small. In the second case there is only one firm.
If there are many firms we are able to prove that the open-loop Nash
equilibrium is a candidate for the feedback Nash and Stackelberg equili-
brium, where the Nash equilibrium effectively sets v(t)-0 for t~ 0 and
ignores (19). The reason for this is that the firm is so small that the
information about the way that the tax rate depends on the capital stock
yields no advantage, because it can not influence it. The Nash equilibrium
is time-consistent, because v(t)-0 for t) 0 implies time-consistency (cf.
Pohjola (1986)). The open-loop Nash solution is easy to calculate and it
turns out that the optimal tax rate is given by
2 - T(k.U.9). Tk)0. Tq~O. (39)
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Along the equilibrium path the following equation holds: ~- láa. So,
given a certain level of capital, the tax rate in the feedback Stackelberg
equilibrium is higher than in the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium.
Because there is open-loop information structure the behaviour of the
firms and consumers are the same as in section 2 and 3. From equations
(~)-(10) it follows that the marginal productivity and the shadow price ofr
capital, i.e. q, is lower in the feedback Stackelberg solution. Hence,
less capital is accumulated and unemployment is higher. In this regime
there is a reduction in the government's utility and a reduction in the
stream of the firm's cash-flow compared with the open-loop Stackelberg
solution (see table 1).
If there is only one firm the open-loop Nash equilibrium is no longer
a candidate for the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium. The difference
between both concepts lies in the behaviour of the firm and not in the
behaviour of the government. The government's tax rate still can be obtai-
ned from equation (39) and it still holds that ~- lá~. The firm's equa-
tion (~) changes into
q - (r.b)q - a(1-T) t (1-a)(i.~(i))k (40)
Hence, in this economy there is less investment and capital than in an
economy with many firms, because of the fact that the firm takes into
account the negative effects of its capital accumulation on taxation (cf.
(39)).
[insert table 1]
So for both players it is better that open-loop is played (see table
1), but at the moment that the capital stock is built up, there is an
incentive for the government to reoptimise and ask a higher tax rate. The
firm's outcome is, of course, lower, if the government cheats the firm by
suddenly asking the high rate instead of sticking to its announced plan.
Therefore, a tíme-inconsistent plan requires binding commitments to force
the government to stick to its announced tax strategy.
The nature of the solutions examined may be further clarified by a
numerical example, which is based on the following two assumptions:
13




and the following parameter values: w-0.5, 6-0.375, n-4.0, b-0.05, g-0.03
and a-0.8. In table 2 the steady-state values for the different solution
concepts are given.
[insert table 2]
This example makes clear the difference between the open-loop and the
feedback solution. The feedback solution yields a higher value of steady-
state tax rate and a lower level of capital stock than the open-loop
solution (see table 2). This lower level of capital stock in the feedback
case yields a lower level of steady-state utility. In the open-loop case
the share of public consumption goods in total output is lower, but pri-
vate consumption and total utility will be higher because there is more
capital. Moreover, the loss in welfare increases if the number of firms is
small in this economy.
7. THE DYNAMIC EVOLUTION OF THE ECONOMY
In sections 5 and 6 we have described the steady-states for the feedback
and open-loop Stackelberg equilibria. In this section we describe the
paths of the economic variables, when the economy goes from its feedback
(for many firms) to the open-loop equilibrium. Because of adjustment costs
the economy moves slowly to its new steady-state. To obtain the solutions
we use a multiple-shooting for rational expectatíons models developed by
Lipton et al. (1982). As a matter of fact the system described in appendix
14
1 is called a two-point boundary problem with 3 backward-looking (k, b and
v) and 3 forward-looking variables (q, x and a).4 This path from the
open-loop to the feedback steady-state can be interpreted as an economy
where the government builds up credibility.5
[insert table 37
In table 3 we see that the economy slowly adjusts to its new steady-
state. At time-point 0 the leve] oF government's and consumers' consump-
tion is lower and the level of investment has increased by more than 31x.
Furthermore, the government reduces the level of profit taxation. One
could raise the question why the government does not lower immediately its
tax rate to the new steady-state. However, the government needs some time
to build up credibility. We see that the tax rate is at its lowest level
after 10 periods, because the government wants to stimulate capital accu-
mulation. At time-point 10 also the level of government's consumption is
at its lowest poínt. However, at time-point 100 we see that the level of
government's consumption is above the level of the initial steady-state.
Although the share of public consumption in total output is less, the
amount will be larger. This example clearly points out the importance of
government's credibility.
Also the interest rate will have a jump at time-point 0. It should be
noted that the interest rate clears the good market. At time-point 0 there
is a growing interest in investment and the interest rate goes up. Because
of the fact that the capital stock increases, the interest rate decreases
smoothly to its steady-state value.
4) This system satisfies the saddle point property of a perfect-foresight
system, since there are three stable and three unstable eigenvalues (cf.,
Buiter (1984)).
5) To get a faster move from its old to its new steady-state we changed
the following parameter values of table 2: w-1.0 and ~-4.0. So, thesteady-state values are different from table 2.
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8. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have developed a macro-economic dynamic model with value-
maximising firms, infinitely long-lived utility-optimising consumers and a
government, which tries to choose its profit tax in such a direction that
the utility of the consumer is maximised. The formal structure of the
interaction between government and firms or consumers corresponds to a
Stackelberg game with the government as leader. However, the introduction
of an optimising government in our framework induces that in a open-loop
game its announced optimal plan is intertemporally time-inconsistent. So,
if there is no reason to believe that the government will stick to its
announced plan, this open-loop concept is no longer useful. In Lhat case
the solution can correspond to the equilibrium of a feedback Stackelberg
game, which is by definition time-consistent. However, this solution
yields a lower value of steady-state utility. In this respect it should be
mentioned that if the announced policy is credible due to commitment or
reputational forces, the time-inconsistent policy can be chosen and there
is a Pareto improvement of steady-state utility. Consequently, the credi-
bility of the government's policy can play an important role in the effec-
tivity of its policy. In this paper we deal with the two possible solu-
tions mentioned above and present an example, which shows the importance
of agreement and consistency in economic theory. Furthermore, we show that
the importance of credibility increases if there are few firms in the
economy. So, if we want to go ínto the real insights of the problem of
time-inconsistency we have to analyse decentralized economies.
In future work, there are many avenues to explore. Firstly, other tax
instruments, like wage or sales taxes, can be analysed. Secondly, we can
investigate what will happen under the assumption of perfect competition
in the labour market. Thirdly, a thorough analysis of reputational equili-
bria is required (e.g. Kreps and Wilson (1982)). Fourthly, it is important
to perform an empirical investigation to establisch in 'which' regime the
economy has been at various times. For a first and interesting attempt see
Weber (1988). Finally, the framework can be used to characterize the
dynamic effects of shocks or policies.
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APPENDIX 1. THE TOTAL MACRO-ECONOMIC MODEL
Given the financing scheme that the Firm finances replacement investment
by retained earnings and net investment by issuing new bonds.
- w
q- q - (rtb)q-a(1-T). q(m)-q .
k: k - ~(q)-ák, k(0)-k0,
. ,~
x: x - (g-r)x, x(m)-x ,






v: v - f~v-(rtb)v-a~ (9)ta9~~(9), U(0)-0. (A5)
X: ~-(~tb)a-lka-(a(1-T)twh)~, X(~)-~~.
c: xc - a,
g - 1-a ~-
g' c - a (1}k(1-a))'
i: i-~(q).
T: g - iak,
1: 1 - hk,
r: f(k,l) - ctgtitp(i)
R: n - (f(k,l)-wl)(1-t)-bk-p(bk)-rb









As already stated before the consumers' problem can be solved indepen-
dently of the government's and the firm's problem. In the feedback equili-
brium the following Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman equations holds for the
government and the firm
PV1-Vlt- max {aln((1-t)aktwhk-i(t,T,k)-~p(i(t,T,k))) t (1-a)ln(iak) tT
Vlk(i(t,z,k)-bk)}, (Ai4)
rV2-V2t- max {(1-T(t,k))ak-i-p(i)tV2k(i-bk)}, (A15)
i
where V1 and V2 are the government's and firm's value function.
From (A15) we can derive the firm's optimal level of investment
19
-1-G~}~2k-0 ~ 1 - ~(v2k)' ~ -l~S~'~, ~(1)-0. (A16)
It is important to notice that the optimal choice of the firm's investment
rate does not depend on the government's tax rate. So, the feedback
Stacke]berg and Nash solutions coincide (see also Basar, Haurie, Ricci
(1985, P. 113)). So, it is sufficient to derive the Feedback Nash equili-
bria. To do so we use the method originally introduced by Starr and Ho
(1969). They write down the same Hamiltonian system as in the open-loop
case, but in the feedback case the instruments are not only a function of
time, but also a function of state (capital). Because of that the costate-
equations may be different from the open-loop case. They show also in that
paper that for the Nash game this method yields the same solution as using









~H1 JH1(t,k,i,i) ~H1 ~i
~ - ~~ - ~k - S~ - ~k - ~i ' ~k
- (F~4b)a-~(a(1-T)twh)-1-a.g




From (A22) the derivative of T with respect to k can be obtained. Substi-
tuting this back into equation (A19) gives us the solution. It should be
20
noticed that thís solution is different from the open-loop Nash solution,
because of the last term in equation ( A19). In some special differential
games this last term disappears ( see for example Van der Ploeg (198~)). In
general this is not the case.
APPENDIX 3. THE DERIVATION OF THE FBS-EQUILIBRIUM WITH MANY FIRMS
Assume now contrary to appendix 1 that there is not one firm, but there
are many firms which all have the same initíal value of capital stock.
Furthermore, assume that
k - ~j-1k~, 1 - ~j-11j,
~P - ~j-1Pj, (A23)
where N is the number of firms. As is well-known in the literature there
are some problems by aggregation over a large number of firms, if we work
for the individual firm with the adjustment costs function as described
in equatíon (41). There would be no problems if we use a homogeneous
adjustment costs function (cf. Hayashi (1982)). However, assume for this
moment that every individual firm has such an adjustment costs function
that its investment is 1~N times aggregate investment, i.e. p-Nni2.
With the same arguments as above we can show that the feedback













i~ - N~(q), J-1,...,N,




Notice that due to the fact that all firms have equal capital stocks the
shadow price is equal for all firms. The crucial point is now that since
k,
the number of Firms is large, the term k~~k - Tk .~k,T is almost zero andJ
equation (A26) becomes equal to (~). To be precize, k~~k goes to zero if N
increases while ~~ k- lt 1 is a constant. It should be noticed thatc~k'T y-i-9~(i)
we assume that if the number of firms increases in this economy the amount
of total capital remains constant. So for the behaviour of the firms it
makes no difference if there is an open-loop or a feedback information
structures. This point is also recognized by Cohen and Michel (i988).
zz
TABLE 1
A comparison of the open-Zoop and feedback equilbria
FEEDBACK STACKELBERG FEEDBACK STACKELBERG OPEN-LOOP STACKELBERG
1 fírm many firms
NO BINDING CONTRACTS NO BINDING CONTRACTS BINDING CONTRACTS
TIME-CONSISTENT TIME-CONSISTENT TIME-INCONSISTENT
w w
g - 1-a g - 1-a




g - 1-a y ~













FEEDBACK STACKELBERG FEEDBACK STACKELBERG OPEN-LOOP STACKELBERG






k - 43.46wc - 46.80~
g - 11.70~i - 2.173~
p(i )- 2.361~ ~f(k ,1 )- 63.04~












f(k ,1 )- 71.11.
u - 39.80. .











f(k ,1 )- 141.6x
u - 67.22,~ w
g ~c - 0.061
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TABLE 3
The dynamtc paths from feedback steady-state (FBS)
to open-Loop steady-state (OLS)
k~b i p(i) T c g f(k,l) u
FsS o.i327 0.1327 0.0110 0.4711 0.8569 o.2i42 i.2126 0.6494
0 o.i327 0.1746 0.0152 0.4498 0.8182 0.2045 1.2i26 o.62oi
1 0.1366 0.2363 0.0279 0.22i2 0.8802 0.1035 1.2479 0.5736
5 0.1626 o.3io7 0.0483 0.0927 1.0748 o.o5i7 1.4854 0.5857
io 0.2029 0.3751 0.0704 0.0690 1.3603 0.0480 1.8537 0.6967
50 o.576z o.7370 0.2716 0.0719 4.1143 0.1420 5.2649 2.0986
ioo 0.8377 0.8959 o.40i3 0.0830 6.1188 0.2383 7.6543 3.1972
200 0.9450 0.9490 0.4503 0.0873 6.9536 0.2825 8.6354 3.6642
oLS o.9492 0.9492 0.4505 0.0899 6.9810 0.2923 8.6730 3.7010
1 g)c r ~ k v q
FsS o.7578 0.2500 0.0300 5.3320 2.6540 0.000o i.1330
0 0.7578 0.2500 o.i3o3 3.9576 2.6540 0.000o i.i746
1 0.7799 0.1176 0.0859 3.8150 2.73i3 -2.6oi2 1.2363
5 0.9284 0.0481 0.0791 3.2446 3.2512 -9.8399 1.3107
io 1.1586 0.0353 0.0750 2.6806 4.0574 -14.i6o5 1.3751
50 3.2906 0.0345 0.0448 1.1380 11.5236 -13.5580 1.7370
100 4.7839 0.0390 0.0337 0.8434 16.7534 -11.4494 i.8959
200 5-3971 0.0406 0.0302 0.7641 18.9009 -10.7891 1.9490
oLS 5.42io o.o4i8 0.0300 0.7641 18.9800 -1o.8ioo i.949o
i
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